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Articles

Understanding Duties and Conflicts of
Interest—A Guide for the Honorable Agent
Linda S. Whitton*
Abstract
This article examines the importance of understanding agent duties
and conflicts of interest, both for drafting a power of attorney that meets
a principal’s objectives and for providing guidance to the agent who will
act under its authority. Professor Whitton suggests that current custom
and practice with respect to powers of attorney often overlooks the need
to adjust agent duties to accommodate the principal’s expectations, thus
resulting in inadvertent conflicts between the duty to do what the
principal expects and default duties of loyalty. The article offers
practical guidelines for identifying and reconciling these conflicts, as
well as best practices to improve the agent’s understanding of the
authority granted in the power of attorney, the principal’s expectations
for exercise of that authority, and the duties an agent must meet when
carrying out the principal’s expectations.

* © 2013 Linda S. Whitton. All rights reserved. Professor of Law, Valparaiso
University Law School. I am the Reporter for the Uniform Power of Attorney Act.
Statements in this Article represent my own views and do not necessarily represent the
position of the Uniform Law Commission.
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INTRODUCTION
Powers of attorney typically make the news only when an agent has
abused the principal-agent relationship.1 Given the importance of
powers of attorney for incapacity planning,2 law reform has focused on
statutory protections to prevent, detect, and redress abuse.3 The Uniform
Power of Attorney Act (“UPOAA”)4 is the leading model for this
reform.5 Far less attention has been paid to honorable agents and the

1. See, e.g., Kristen Doerschner, Power of Attorney Can Lead to Financial Abuse,
TIMESONLINE (Sept. 15, 2012, 11:45 PM), http://bit.ly/ZalPJ3; Dennis B. Roddy,
Courting Trouble: The Document Granting ‘Power of Attorney’ Often Leads to Abuse,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Sept. 2, 2007, 12:00 AM), http://bit.ly/146kxqd; Toddi
Gutner, “License to Steal” from Seniors, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (June 4, 2006),
http://buswk.co/Mkwih3.
2. See Linda S. Whitton, Durable Powers as an Alternative to Guardianship:
Lessons We Have Learned, 37 STETSON L. REV. 7, 8-9 (2007) [hereinafter Whitton,
Lessons Learned] (noting widespread use of powers of attorney in every jurisdiction).
3. See Linda S. Whitton, The New Uniform Power of Attorney Act: Balancing
Protection of the Principal, the Agent, and Third Persons, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 41ST
ANNUAL HECKERLING INSTITUTE ON ESTATE PLANNING ¶¶ 900, 901.2 (Matthew Bender
2007) (providing an overview of the UPOAA provisions designed to prevent financial
exploitation as well as those aimed at detecting and redressing abuse).
4. UNIF. POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT (2006), 8B U.L.A. 57 (Supp. 2012).
5. See Lori A. Stiegel & Ellen V. Klem, Power of Attorney Abuse: What States Can
Do About It, AARP PUB. POL’Y INST. 1 (2008), available at http://bit.ly/Xo3XLs
(comparing current state laws with the Uniform Power of Attorney Act). To date, 14
jurisdictions have adopted the Uniform Power of Attorney Act: Alabama, Arkansas,
Colorado, Idaho, Maine, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, Ohio, U.S. Virgin
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guidance they may need to understand and perform their duties.
Providing this guidance is essential because a power of attorney is only
as effective as the agent who acts under it.6
The lack of attention given to the agent’s perspective can be
explained in part by the nature of the power of attorney relationship. A
power of attorney is generally the co-creation of the principal and the
principal’s lawyer. Appointing the agent is a unilateral act, typically
completed by the principal without the participation of the person named
as agent and possibly without that person’s knowledge.7 The principal’s
lawyer likely will not have contact with the named agent until such time
as the principal becomes incapacitated.8
When a principal has lost capacity, the agent takes the principal’s
place in the attorney-client relationship.9 The principal’s lawyer consults
the agent as the principal’s appointed representative, but does not
represent the agent as an individual serving in the agent’s role.10 If the
agent has questions about duties and conflicts of interest, the principal’s
lawyer may be reluctant to answer such questions for fear that the
discussion could blur representational lines and violate the lawyer’s
ethical duties to the principal.11
Not only does the custom and practice with respect to powers of
attorney seem to leave agents out of the loop, the law—common and

Islands, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Legislative Fact Sheet—Power of
Attorney, UNIF. LAW COMM’N, http://bit.ly/16HGD29 (last visited Feb. 13, 2013).
6. See Whitton, Lessons Learned, supra note 2, at 10-38 (examining the role of the
agent and discussing drafting and legislative reform strategies for optimal agent
effectiveness and fidelity to the principal’s objectives).
7. Given the unilateral process by which an agent is named in a power of attorney,
some type of acceptance is necessary to provide a reference point for when the agency
begins and agent duties arise. Under the UPOAA, “exercising authority,” “performing
duties as an agent,” or “any other assertion or conduct indicating acceptance” is sufficient
to establish that a principal-agent relationship has commenced. UNIF. POWER OF
ATTORNEY ACT § 113 (2006), 8B U.L.A. 79 (Supp. 2012).
8. Russell E. Haddleton, The Durable Power of Attorney: An Evolving Tool, 14
PROB. & PROP. 58, 61 (2000) (describing the drafting lawyer’s dilemma when approached
by an agent for advice after the client has become incapacitated).
9. See Linda S. Whitton, Durable Powers as a Hedge Against Guardianship:
Should the Attorney-at-Law Accept Appointment as Attorney-in-Fact, 2 ELDER L.J. 39,
53-67 (1994) (discussing the importance of client-centered decision making in the
attorney-client relationship and the role of the agent as the representative of the
incapacitated principal).
10. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.14 cmt. 4 (2002) (stating, in
pertinent part, that “[i]f a legal representative has already been appointed for the client,
the lawyer should ordinarily look to the representative for decisions on behalf of the
client”).
11. See Haddleton, supra note 8, at 61.
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statutory—provided little guidance to agents prior to the UPOAA.12
Describing the agent’s role as “unscripted”13 and “uniquely
directionless,”14 scholars urged law reform to set clearly articulated
statutory standards.15 The UPOAA contains detailed provisions about
agent duties,16 including the issue of conflicts of interest,17 but no
scholarship to date has focused specifically on what agents need to
understand about duties and conflicts of interest or how agents are to
receive that information. The purpose of this article is to explore best
practices for drafting and client counseling to meet that need.
Using the UPOAA as a model, Part I provides an overview of agent
duties, distinguishing the mandatory duties that all agents must meet
from default duties that the principal may modify. The discussion
highlights areas where agents may need more guidance if they are to
understand their obligations. Part II addresses circumstances where the
duty to follow the principal’s expectations may produce inadvertent
conflicts with the agent’s duties of loyalty. Practical guidelines are
offered for identifying and reconciling these conflicts.
I.

AGENT DUTIES

An agent’s duties emanate from three possible sources—the power
of attorney statute, the language of the power of attorney, and, if not
superseded by statute or the power of attorney, the common law of
agency.18 Under the first Uniform Act for powers of attorney—The
12. Karen E. Boxx, The Durable Power of Attorney’s Place in the Family of
Fiduciary Relationships, 36 GA. L. REV. 1, 4, 42-62 (2001) (pointing out “numerous
ambiguities regarding the attorney-in-fact’s duties”).
13. Carolyn L. Dessin, Acting as Agent Under a Financial Durable Power of
Attorney: An Unscripted Role, 75 NEB. L. REV. 574, 584 (1996) (observing that “neither
courts nor legislatures appear to have given much thought to the appropriate role of an
agent”).
14. Boxx, supra note 12, at 44.
15. Id. at 44-46 (arguing that clear fiduciary duties are needed to compensate for the
loss of monitoring function that accompanies a principal’s incapacity); Dessin, supra note
13, at 602 (noting the lack of standards to govern the agent’s behavior).
16. UNIF. POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT § 114 (2006), 8B U.L.A. 80-81 (Supp. 2012).
“Section 114 clarifies agent duties by articulating minimum mandatory duties . . . as well
as default duties that can be modified or omitted by the principal. . . .” Id. § 114 cmt.
17. Id. § 114(b)(2), 8B U.L.A. 80 (requiring the agent, unless otherwise specified in
the power of attorney, to “act so as not to create a conflict of interest that impairs the
agent’s ability to act impartially in the principal’s best interest”); id. § 114(d), 8B U.L.A.
81 (“An agent that acts with care, competence, and diligence for the best interest of the
principal is not liable solely because the agent also benefits from the act or has an
individual or conflicting interest in relation to the property or affairs of the principal.”).
18. See id. art. 1 cmt., 8B U.L.A. 64 (noting that “[a]lthough the UPOAA is
primarily a default statute, Article 1 also contains rules that govern all powers of attorney
subject to the Act”); id. § 121, 8B U.L.A. 95 (providing that the principles of law and
equity supplement the UPOAA); id. § 121 cmt., 8B U.L.A. 95 (explaining that the Act is
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Uniform Durable Power of Attorney Act19—agent duties were not
articulated and thus left for discernment from the common law of
agency.20 The UPOAA Drafting Committee chose to enumerate specific
duties because neither the common law nor existing state statutes
provided a cohesive fiduciary standard for the power of attorney
relationship.21
Agent duties under the UPOAA fall into two categories—
mandatory and default.22 Mandatory duties set the baseline for agent
conduct and may not be altered in the power of attorney.23 The default
duties apply to agent conduct unless modified in the power of attorney.24
A.

Mandatory Duties

Under the UPOAA, three mandatory duties set the minimum
standard for agent conduct. The agent must:
(1)

act in accordance with the principal’s reasonable
expectations to the extent actually known by the agent and,
otherwise, in the principal’s best interest;

(2)

act in good faith; and

(3)

act only within the scope of authority granted in the power
25
of attorney.

These fiduciary duties form the foundation of the principal-agent
relationship. Taken together, they in essence require that the agent act
honestly within the granted scope of authority to do what the principal
expects. In theory, this mandate seems straightforward, but the

supplemented by the common law of agency “where the provisions of the Act do not
displace relevant common law principles”).
19. UNIF. DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT (amended 1987), 8A U.L.A. 233
(2003).
20. See John H. Langbein, Questioning the Trust Law Duty of Loyalty: Sole Interest
or Best Interest?, 114 YALE L.J. 929, 943 (2005) (observing that because the Uniform
Durable Power of Attorney Act does not regulate an agent’s duties, the common law of
agency “sole interest rule” would apply to the fiduciary duties of such agents).
21. UNIF. POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT § 114 cmt. (2006), 8B U.L.A. 81-82 (Supp.
2012) (noting that existing statutory standards for agent conduct varied widely from a
“due care standard” to a “trustee-type standard,” and explaining that the departure of the
UPOAA from the “sole interest test” of the common law “comports with the practical
reality that most agents under powers of attorney are family members who have inherent
conflicts of interest with the principal”).
22. See supra note 16.
23. See infra notes 25-68 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 70-87 and accompanying text.
25. UNIF. POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT § 114(a) (2006), 8B U.L.A. 80 (Supp. 2012).
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following discussion will demonstrate why, in practice, agents often lack
the guidance they need to perform their duties.
1.

The duty to act according to the principal’s reasonable
expectations if known; and otherwise, to act according to the
principal’s best interest.

The mandatory duty to follow the principal’s reasonable
expectations if known, and, if not known, to act according to the
principal’s best interest, sets the general decision-making standard for all
agent conduct.26 This standard reflects a public policy preference for
surrogate decisions based on “substituted judgment” whenever that is
possible.27 Commentary to the UPOAA acknowledges that “[t]he Act
does not require, nor does common practice dictate, that the principal
state expectations or objectives in the power of attorney.”28 Thus, the
Act contemplates that expectations may be communicated informally.
A power of attorney document in which specific expectations are
stated creates a risk that the principal’s expectations will be frozen in
time, binding the agent’s flexibility to respond to changing
circumstances. Consider the following:

26. Id. § 114 cmt., 8B U.L.A. 81 (“Establishing the principal’s reasonable
expectations as the primary guideline for agent conduct is consistent with a policy
preference for ‘substituted judgment’ over ‘best interest’ as the surrogate decisionmaking standard that better protects an incapacitated person’s self-determination
interests.”).
27. Id. Substituted judgment is the long-favored standard for surrogate health care
decisions. See Lawrence A. Frolik & Linda S. Whitton, The UPC Substituted
Judgment/Best Interest Standard for Guardian Decisions: A Proposal for Reform, 45 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 739, 758-59 (2012) (noting that the Uniform Health-Care Decisions
Act prioritizes substituted judgment over best interest). The standard was re-endorsed for
guardian decisions by the Third National Guardianship Summit as Recommendation #1.5
of the Overview of Guardian Standards, which provides:
States should adopt by statute a decision-making standard that provides
guidance for using substituted judgment and best interest principles in guardian
decisions.

These standards should emphasize self-determination and the
preference for substituted judgment.

The Uniform Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Act
should be revised to embody these objectives.
Third National Guardianship Summit Standards and Recommendations, 2012 UTAH L.
REV. 1191, 1199.
28. UNIF. POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT § 114 cmt. (2006), 8B U.L.A. 81 (Supp. 2012)
(observing further that “one of the advantages of a power of attorney over a trust or
guardianship is the flexibility and informality with which an agent may exercise authority
and respond to changing circumstances”).
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Client Scenario
Pamela, a conscientious lawyer, conducts a thorough
interview with Douglas, a client who wishes to establish a
substitute decision-making plan using a power of attorney.
Pamela discusses the various types of authority that Douglas
can delegate, including extraordinary powers such as the
authority to make a gift or to create and change beneficiary
designations.29 Pamela counsels Douglas about the benefits
of a broad power of attorney as a hedge against
guardianship.30 She also identifies the potential dangers of
delegating authority that could alter his estate plan.31 They
discuss at length the scope of authority needed to meet his
needs and objectives. In addition, Pamela stresses the
importance of selecting a trustworthy agent and successor
agent. Douglas decides to name his wife as his initial agent
and his 26-year-old son as his successor agent. Douglas has
two other children—a daughter who is 22 and a younger son
who is 18.
Douglas chooses to grant his wife the broadest possible
authority. He states that they share the same views about
handling property and finances and that he implicitly trusts
her. Douglas wants his wife to have unlimited authority to
make gifts and to retitle their property, for her benefit and for
the benefit of their children. He stresses that his wife must
have authority to create and change beneficiary designations
because they periodically make adjustments to their nonprobate distribution plan to offset differences in the financial
support they give to their respective children. Examples of
past support include a down payment for their oldest son’s
home, their daughter’s law school tuition, and the legal bills
for their youngest son’s driving-while-intoxicated offense.
Douglas is not comfortable giving his successor agent—
his oldest son—the same breadth of authority as granted to his
29. See id. § 201(a), 8B U.L.A. 97 (listing these and other actions for which an
express grant of authority is required in the power of attorney).
30. “There is unavoidable tension in the question of how much authority to give an
agent. If the scope of authority is not broad enough, a guardianship may still be needed
in the event of later incapacity; the broader the authority, however, the greater the
potential for abuse.” Whitton, Lessons Learned, supra note 2, at 19.
31. See UNIF. POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT § 201 cmt. (2006), 8B U.L.A. 98 (Supp.
2012) (noting the risk that accompanies delegation of authority for actions enumerated in
section 201, but observing that “such authority may nevertheless be necessary to
effectuate the principal’s property management and estate planning objectives”).
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wife. He states that his children do not know the exact level
of financial support received by their siblings and that he
wishes to keep that information confidential. Douglas also
mentions significant sibling rivalry between his sons.
Although Douglas believes that his oldest son would rise to
the occasion if he were needed to serve as Douglas’s agent,
Douglas plans to postpone telling him about the appointment.
Douglas views the successor appointment as merely a
precaution against the unlikely event that his wife, ten years
his junior, predeceases him.
Douglas’s wife accompanies him to the follow-up
appointment with Pamela. Pamela explains that Douglas is
her client and that she represents solely his interests.
Douglas’s wife acknowledges the limits of Pamela’s legal
representation, but adds that she and Douglas are “on the
same page.” Before Douglas executes the power of attorney,
Pamela reviews the scope of authority with him and his wife.
In the foregoing example, Douglas counts on the history of shared
decision making with his wife to inform her future decisions as his
agent.32 This history, plus Douglas’s implicit trust in his wife, supports
Pamela’s drafting decision to forego memorializing his expectations. In
fact, reducing to writing all of the possible scenarios that might occur
with the couple’s three children would be impractical and probably
counter-productive. The client does not wish to hamper his wife’s ability
to respond flexibly to the changing and differing needs of their
children.33
The more difficult drafting and counseling challenge is posed by the
possibility that Douglas’s son may someday succeed to authority under
the power of attorney. The son does not have a history of shared
decision making with his father. In fact, Douglas indicated that he and
his wife have kept financial decisions confidential. If the son succeeds to
authority, how will he know his father’s expectations?
Even where expectations have been communicated, if the principal
loses capacity, the agent (or successor agent) will likely face decisions
for which the principal left no specific directions. Turning to the statute
for direction, an agent may find more questions than answers. Such
questions include: What does the phrase “reasonable expectations”
32. See Marshall B. Kapp, Who’s the Parent Here? The Family’s Impact on the
Autonomy of Older Persons, 41 EMORY L.J. 773, 785 (1992) (observing that “[s]hared
decision-making affords a chance for continuing dialogue that informs future proxies
more fully about the individual’s values and preferences concerning later decisions”).
33. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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mean? Are specific instructions required or will the principal’s general
objectives, values, and preferences suffice? If no expectations can be
ascertained about a decision to be made, does “best interest” mean a
decision that is solely beneficial to the principal, or may the agent take
into account the interests of others that the principal likely would have
considered?
These questions were explored by the author and Professor
Lawrence Frolik in research conducted for the Third National
Guardianship Summit.34 We were charged with developing a practical
understanding of “substituted judgment” and “best interest” based on a
review of scholarly literature, statutes, case law, and empirical data
collected from our guardian survey.35 We found that notions of
substituted judgment (i.e., doing what the incapacitated person expects)
and best interest (i.e., doing what is best for the incapacitated person) do
not fit neatly into two contrasting models.36 Instead, each concept is
more accurately understood as providing a process for decision making
along a hierarchical continuum, moving from “strict substituted
judgment” at the top of the hierarchy (where specific directions or
expressed wishes exist to guide the decision), to “strict best interest” at
the bottom of the hierarchy (where no information can be obtained about
what the person would want).37
In between the ideal decision making circumstance of specific
directions and the generic best interest inquiry of last resort, there are
interim points on the hierarchy.38 When no specific directions exist, an
expanded notion of substituted judgment permits decisions based on “the
incapacitated person’s prior general statements, actions, values, and
preferences.”39 If there are none, then the next interim point on the
hierarchy is an expanded notion of best interest.40

34. See Sally Hurme & Erica Wood, Introduction, Symposium, Third National
Guardianship Summit: Standards of Excellence, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1157 (providing an
overview of the guardianship reform history predating the Summit, the issues considered
during the Summit, and the standards and recommendations adopted by the Summit
delegates).
35. See generally Linda S. Whitton & Lawrence A. Frolik, Surrogate DecisionMaking Standards for Guardians: Theory and Reality, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1491.
36. Id. at 1504-15 (synthesizing the spectrum of viewpoints on substituted judgment
and best interest into five models).
37. Frolik & Whitton, supra note 27, at 750-57 (proposing the substituted judgmentbest interest continuum model for surrogate decisions).
38. Id. at 752 (illustrating the substituted judgment-best interest continuum).
39. Id. at 754-55 (noting that although “Expanded Substituted Judgment does not
afford the degree of certainty that Strict Substituted Judgment does,” it facilitates a
decision that is “a best estimate of what the incapacitated person would have done”).
40. Id. at 755-56 (observing that “[a]t times, evidence of what the incapacitated
person would have done is too thin to support even Expanded Substituted Judgment”).
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Expanded best interest permits decisions based on “the benefits and
burdens for the incapacitated person, as discerned from available
information, including the views of professionals and others with
sufficient interest in the incapacitated person’s welfare.”41 Decisions
based on expanded best interest could “also include consideration of
consequences for others that a reasonable person in the incapacitated
person’s circumstances would consider.”42 This expanded notion of best
interest recognizes that individuals do not live in a vacuum. Most have
family members—for example, a spouse, children, and grandchildren—
whose interests would be considered if the individual were still able to
make a contemporaneous decision.43 Some of the earliest substitute
decision-making cases recognize consideration of such interests even
where the incapacitated person left no specific instructions.44
Based on our research, we proposed a revision to the decisionmaking standard in Section 314(a) of the Uniform Guardianship and
Protective Proceedings Act.45 The purpose of the proposal is to clarify
the decision-making process along this hierarchical continuum so that
guardians have better guidance for making substitute decisions.46 In
pertinent part, the proposed revised standard guides the guardian to:
(1)

act in accordance with the ward’s reasonable current or prior
directions, expressed desires, and opinions to the extent
actually known or ascertainable by the guardian; or if
unknown and unascertainable,

(2)

act in accordance with the ward’s reasonable prior general
statements, actions, values, and preferences to the extent
actually known or ascertainable by the guardian; or, if
unknown and unascertainable,

(3)

act in accordance with the ward’s best interest as determined
from reasonable information received from professionals
and persons who demonstrate sufficient interest in the

41. Id. at 751.
42. Frolik & Whitton, supra note 27, at 751.
43. Id. at 756 (advising care, however, that consideration of the interests of others
“does not cross the line into exploitation . . . of the incapacitated person”).
44. See id. at 756 n.49 (discussing the seminal case of In re Whitbread, (1816) 35
Eng. Rep. 878 (Ch.), in which the court granted a petition to increase the allowance of
the incapacitated’s niece on the premise that a person in the circumstances of the
incapacitated would prefer this outcome to the embarrassment of the niece’s poverty).
45. UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP & PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS ACT § 314(a) (1997), 8A
U.L.A. 369 (2003).
46. Frolik & Whitton, supra note 27, at 758 (noting that the prioritization of
substituted judgment over best interest in the proposal “is consistent with policies
embodied in the Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act and the Uniform Power of Attorney
Act”).
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ward’s welfare, which determination may include
consideration of consequences for others that a reasonable
47
person in the ward’s circumstances would consider.

Although the proposal is framed in the context of guardianship, the
hierarchical decision-making continuum is also useful in the context of
powers of attorney. The drafting attorney could insert this language in a
power of attorney to provide the agent with a process for decision
making when the agent has no prior directions from, or shared decisionmaking history with, the principal. The goal is to guide the agent to a
decision that approximates, as closely as possible, what the principal
would have decided.
2.

The duty to act in good faith.

The second mandatory duty—to act in good faith—is probably the
easiest of the mandatory duties for layperson agents to understand. The
UPOAA defines “good faith” as “honesty in fact.”48 Applied to agent
conduct, the duty of good faith does not require competence, but merely
honesty.49 In fact, the Act permits a principal to exonerate the agent for
incompetent performance provided the agent’s actions are not
“committed dishonestly, with an improper motive, or with reckless
indifference to the purposes of the power of attorney or the best interest
of the principal.”50 In other words, an exoneration provision may not
exculpate an agent for failure to act in good faith.51
3.

The duty to act only within the scope of authority granted in
the power of attorney.

The third mandatory duty—to “act only within the scope of
authority granted in the power of attorney”52—presumes that an agent
understands the meaning and limits of the authority granted. The trend
in modern power of attorney practice is to use statutory short forms or
brief descriptive terms that incorporate by reference lengthy statutory

47. Id. at 757-58.
48. UNIF. POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT § 102(4) (2006), 8B U.L.A. 65 (Supp. 2012).
49. Honesty in fact represents a subjective standard, often described as “the ‘pure
heart, empty head’ test of good faith.” Dennis M. Patterson, Wittgenstein and the Code:
A Theory of Good Faith Performance and Enforcement under Article Nine, 137 U. PA. L.
REV. 335, 381 (1988).
50. UNIF. POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT § 115 (2006), 8B U.L.A. 83 (Supp. 2012).
51. Id. § 115 cmt., 8B U.L.A. 84 (noting that “[t]he mandatory minimum standard of
conduct required of an agent is equivalent to the good faith standard applicable to
trustees”).
52. Id. § 114(a)(3), 8B U.L.A. 80.
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definitions of authority.53 This practice eases the drafting burden for
lawyers and establishes accepted nomenclature upon which third persons
can rely when conducting transactions with the agent.54
The practice of incorporating authority by reference may be
convenient for lawyers and those who deal with agents, but it leaves
layperson principals and their agents with little to inform their
understanding of the authority granted. Even if the principal and agent
read the statute (which is unlikely), the complexity for laypersons is
daunting.55 An overview of the authority provisions in the UPOAA
illustrates this point.
The UPOAA distinguishes between areas of authority that must be
delegated with express language56 and those that can be inferred from a
general grant of authority.57
An express grant is required for authority to:
(1)

create, amend, revoke, or terminate an inter vivos trust;

(2)

make a gift;

(3)

create or change rights of survivorship;

(4)

create or change a beneficiary designation;

(5)

delegate authority granted under the power of attorney;

(6)

waive the principal’s right to be a beneficiary of a joint
and survivor annuity, including a survivor benefit under
a retirement plan; or

(7)

exercise fiduciary powers that the principal has authority
to delegate; or

(8)

disclaim property, including a power of appointment.

58

The requirement of an express grant for the foregoing powers is a
precaution against inadvertent delegation of authority that could alter the
principal’s property holdings and estate plan.59
53. Id. art. 2 cmt., 8B U.L.A. 97.
54. Id. art. 3 cmt., 8B U.L.A. 117 (observing that “[t]he familiarity and common
understanding achieved with the use of one statutory form also facilitates acceptance of
powers of attorney”).
55. Article 2 of the UPOAA, which sets out the authority provisions in the Act,
comprises 17 sections of the Act and 9 pages of the Uniform Laws Annotated. UNIF.
POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT §§ 201-17 (2006), 8B U.L.A. 97-116 (Supp. 2012).
56. Id. § 201(a), 8B U.L.A. 97.
57. Id. § 201(c), 8B U.L.A. 97 (“[I]f a power of attorney grants to an agent authority
to do all acts that a principal could do, the agent has the general authority described in
Sections 204 through 216.”).
58. Id. § 201(a), 8B U.L.A. 97 (brackets in original omitted).

2013]

UNDERSTANDING DUTIES AND CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

1049

Authority over all other subject areas may be delegated by a general
grant.60 For example, the Act provides that a general grant empowering
an agent “to do all acts that a principal could do”61 includes authority to
act on the principal’s behalf with respect to the following:














real property
tangible personal property
stocks and bonds
commodities and options
banks and other financial institutions
operation of an entity or business
insurance and annuities
estates, trusts, and other beneficial interests
claims and litigation
personal and family maintenance
benefits from governmental programs or civil or military
service
retirement plans
taxes62

Nonspecific general grants “to do all acts that a principal could do”
are not common in lawyer-drafted powers of attorney, but lawyers
frequently use brief descriptive labels to incorporate areas of authority by
reference.63 The UPOAA, which provides detailed descriptions for each
area of general authority,64 offers an optional statutory form for this

59. See id. § 201 cmt., 8B U.L.A. 98. The Act’s optional statutory form cautions
principals about the potential danger of delegating these powers. Id. § 301, 8B U.L.A.
119 (including on the statutory form power of attorney the following notice to the
principal: “CAUTION: Granting any of the following will give your agent the authority
to take actions that could significantly reduce your property or change how your property
is distributed at your death.”).
60. UNIF. POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT § 201 cmt., 8B U.L.A. 98.
61. See supra note 57.
62. These are the brief terms for areas of authority described in UPOAA sections
204 through 216, UNIF. POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT §§ 204-16 (2006), 8B U.L.A. 102-14
(Supp. 2012), and are used to incorporate by reference those descriptions in the Act’s
optional statutory form. Id. § 301, 8B U.L.A. 118.
63. Section 202 of the UPOAA permits incorporation by reference by using the
descriptive term for the subject area or citing to the statutory section where the authority
is described. Id. § 202, 8B U.L.A. 100. The concept of incorporating by reference
statutory definitions of authority pre-dates the UPOAA. The Uniform Statutory Form
Power of Attorney Act (1988) is representative of this approach. UNIF. STATUTORY FORM
POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT (1988), 8B U.L.A. 194 (2001); see also id. § 202 cmt., 8B
U.L.A. 101.
64. See supra note 62.
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purpose.65 Incorporation by reference may ease the drafting burden for
the lawyer (and avoid lengthy power of attorney documents), but the
short descriptive terms do not tell the layperson, whether principal or
agent, much about the actual scope of authority granted.
If the scope of authority is not clear on the face of the power of
attorney, how is the average agent to understand what it means to act
within that scope? The practical response is that the agent needs some
type of education. Unfortunately, the typical manner in which powers of
attorney are created may leave this need unmet.
Consider again the example of Douglas, the client for whom Pamela
drafted a power of attorney. Pamela verbally explained the power of
attorney to Douglas and his wife, but she did not provide them with a
written explanation of the scope of authority. An additional step in the
representation—creating a separate explanatory document—could
increase the likelihood that the agent and successor agent will understand
what they are empowered to do if the power of attorney is later needed.
Depending on the power of attorney, this separate document might be
basic—simply restating the full statutory descriptions of granted
authority,66 or more complex—noting areas of authority that have been
added by express grant or modified in the power of attorney.67
Such a document serves a dual purpose. First, the drafting lawyer
can review the document with the principal to confirm that the power of
attorney contains the delegation of authority intended by the principal.
Second, the lawyer or the principal can use the document to explain the
scope of delegated authority to the agent. If this discussion does not take
place in the drafting lawyer’s office or between the agent and principal
before the principal loses capacity, the explanatory document at least
provides a means of self-education for the agent.
A document that explains the scope of authority may also be
required by persons who transact with the agent. The UPOAA permits
such persons to request, as a condition to accepting the agent’s authority,
an opinion of counsel as to any matter of law concerning the power of

65. UNIF. POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT § 301, 8B U.L.A. 117-22.
66. For example, see the full statutory descriptions of authority contained in the
UPOAA. Id. §§ 204-17, 8B U.L.A. 102-16.
67. As explained in the comment to section 201 of the UPOAA:
[W]ith any authority incorporated by reference in a power of attorney, the
principal may enlarge or restrict the default parameters set by the Act.
With respect to other acts listed in Section 201(a), the Act contemplates that the
principal will specify any special instructions in the power of attorney to further
define or limit the authority granted.
Id. § 201 cmt., 8B U.L.A. 98.
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attorney.68 As a “best practice,” an opinion letter prepared at the time the
power of attorney is drafted may be the most efficient and cost effective
means of educating the agent and facilitating prompt acceptance of the
agent’s authority.
An opinion letter may be particularly useful in circumstances where
the scope of authority granted to the initial agent is broader than that
granted to the successor. Consider again the example of Douglas who
appointed his wife as his initial agent and his oldest son as his successor
agent.69 He granted much broader authority to his wife than he granted
to his son. Douglas also contemplated not informing his son about the
appointment until a later point in time. If Douglas’s son has some
awareness of the transactions conducted by his mother on his father’s
behalf—such as making gifts or changing beneficiary designations—
might he not conclude that he too will have that authority as the
successor agent? This example illustrates why an opinion of counsel, or
other explanatory document, should be considered a staple part of a
drafting lawyer’s services. Without the benefit of the drafting lawyer’s
verbal explanation or an explanatory document, a successor may
misapprehend the scope of his authority and have nothing to inform him
otherwise.
B.

Default Duties

Beyond the mandatory duties, the Act’s default duties also bind an
agent unless the duties are removed or modified in the power of
attorney.70 The UPOAA default duties require the agent to:
(1)

act loyally for the principal’s benefit;

(2)

act so as not to create a conflict of interest that impairs the
agent’s ability to act impartially in the principal’s best interest;

(3)

act with the care, competence, and diligence ordinarily
exercised by agents in similar circumstances;

68. Id. § 119(d), 8B U.L.A. 88. An opinion of counsel might be requested, for
example, when an agent presents the power of attorney to engage in a transaction
somewhere other than the state in which the power of attorney was drafted. Default rules
with respect to agent authority can vary jurisdiction to jurisdiction. See Linda S.
Whitton, Crossing State Lines with Durable Powers, 17 PROB. & PROP. 28 (2003). For
example, authority with respect to insurance transactions might include, in one
jurisdiction, the ability to create or change beneficiary designations, while, in a UPOAA
jurisdiction, an express grant of specific authority would be required. UNIF. POWER OF
ATTORNEY ACT § 201(a), 8B U.L.A. 97.
69. See supra pp. 1043-44 (client scenario).
70. See UNIF. POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT § 114 cmt., 8B U.L.A. 81 (noting that the
principal may modify or omit default duties).
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(4)

keep a record of all receipts, disbursements, and transactions
made on behalf of the principal;

(5)

cooperate with a person that has authority to make health-care
decisions for the principal to carry out the principal’s
reasonable expectations to the extent actually known by the
agent and, otherwise, act in the principal’s best interest; and

(6)

attempt to preserve the principal’s estate plan, to the extent
actually known by the agent, if preserving the plan is
consistent with the principal’s best interest based on all
relevant factors, including:
(a)

the value and nature of the principal’s property;

(b)

the principal’s foreseeable obligations and need for
maintenance;

(c)

minimization of taxes, including income, estate,
inheritance, generation-skipping transfer, and gift taxes;
and

(d)

eligibility for a benefit, a program, or assistance under a
statute or regulation.71

In addition to the foregoing, the Act acknowledges an agent’s duty to
account (i.e., “disclose receipts, disbursements, or transactions conducted
on behalf of the principal”) but limits the persons who can request this
information.72
Most of the default duties have a direct correlate in the common law
of agency—acting loyally73 and with care, competence, and diligence;74
avoiding conflicts of interest;75 keeping records and accounting for
transactions.76 The other two default duties—cooperation with the
principal’s health-care agent and preservation of the principal’s estate
71. Id. § 114(b), 8B U.L.A. 80.
72. Id. § 114(h), 8B U.L.A. 81. An agent must only disclose information if “ordered
by a court or requested by the principal, a guardian, a conservator, another fiduciary
acting for the principal, a governmental agency having authority to protect the welfare of
the principal, or, upon the death of the principal, by the personal representative or
successor in interest to the principal’s estate.” Id. This duty is also subject to
modification by the principal because the full statutory provision begins with the phrase
“[e]xcept as otherwise provided in the power of attorney.” See id. art. 1 cmt., 8B U.L.A.
64 (noting that “the default provisions are clearly indicated by signals such as ‘unless the
power of attorney otherwise provides,’ or ‘except as otherwise provided in the power of
attorney’; “[t]hese signals alert the draftsperson to options for enlarging or limiting the
Act’s default terms”).
73. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (2006).
74. Id. § 8.08.
75. Id. §§ 8.02, 8.03.
76. Id. § 8.12.
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plan—may be viewed as an outgrowth of the common law duty to follow
a principal’s instructions,77 but they are duties crafted specifically for the
personal power of attorney relationship.78 Their purpose is to “protect
the principal’s previously-expressed choices.”79
Under the common law, agent duties are distinguished as either
“duties of loyalty” or “duties of performance.”80 Applying this
distinction to the default duties under the UPOAA, two are duties of
loyalty: the duty to “act loyally for the principal’s benefit”81 and the duty
to “act so as not to create a conflict of interest that impairs the agent’s
ability to act impartially in the principal’s best interest.”82 All of the
remaining default duties are duties of performance.83
The advisability of removing or modifying the default duties will
depend on a principal’s individual circumstances.84 For example, if the
principal anticipates that contentious family members will challenge the
agent’s conduct, an exoneration provision may be considered to reduce
the agent’s liability exposure (thus overriding the default duty to act with
“care, competence, and diligence”).85 If the principal prefers not to
disclose the estate plan to the agent, or places a higher priority on inter
vivos use of assets than post mortem distribution, the principal may
choose to relieve the agent of the duty to preserve the principal’s estate
plan.86 In situations where the principal intends the agent to use property
for the benefit of the agent (e.g., paying tuition costs for the agent or the
agent’s children), a partial override of the default duties to act loyally
and avoid conflicts of interest may be necessary.87 The following Part

77. Id. § 8.09.
78. UNIF. POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT § 114 cmt., 8B U.L.A. 81-82.
79. Id.
80. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY ch. 8 (distinguishing duties of loyalty in
Title B from duties of performance in Title C); Deborah A. DeMott, Disloyal Agents, 58
ALA. L. REV. 1049, 1052-53 (discussing the distinction between duties of loyalty and
duties of performance).
81. UNIF. POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT § 114(b)(1), 8B U.L.A. 80.
82. Id. § 114(b)(2), 8B U.L.A. 80.
83. See id. §§ 114(b)(3)-(b)(6), (h), 8B U.L.A. 80-81 (providing for duties of care,
competence, and diligence; record keeping; cooperation with the principal’s health care
agent; preservation of the principal’s estate plan; and the duty to account).
84. Id. § 114 cmt., 8B U.L.A. 81-82.
85. See id. § 115 & cmt., 8B U.L.A. 83-84.
86. See Whitton, Lessons Learned, supra note 2, at 28-29 (noting that “the principal
has no affirmative obligation to disclose to an agent any information about the principal’s
property or estate plan”).
87. UNIF. POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT § 114 cmt., 8B U.L.A. 81 (noting that “[i]f a
principal’s expectations potentially conflict with a default duty under the Act, then stating
the expectations in the power of attorney, or altering the default rule to accommodate the
expectations, or both, is advisable”).
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discusses at greater length the interplay of a principal’s expectations with
agent duties and conflicts of interest.
II.

RECONCILING CONFLICTING DUTIES AND CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

The UPOAA’s distinction between mandatory and default duties
provides drafting options for the principal’s lawyer,88 but, to choose
among them, the drafting lawyer must determine whether the agent’s
duty to follow the principal’s expectations (a mandatory duty) could
produce inadvertent conflicts with the agent’s duties of loyalty (default
duties). In order to identify needed drafting adjustments, the principal’s
lawyer must gather information about the principal’s objectives and any
pre-existing conflicts of interest with the intended agent. The following
discussion suggests an analysis for determining, based on that
information, where drafting adjustments in the power of attorney should
be made.
This discussion is divided into two sections. The first examines the
treatment of conflicts of interest under the UPOAA and how that
treatment differs from the common law. The second section looks at
circumstances in which the agent’s mandatory duty to follow the
principal’s reasonable expectations may cause inadvertent conflicts with
the default duties of loyalty (i.e., the duty to “act loyally for the
principal’s benefit,”89 and the duty to “act so as not to create a conflict of
interest that impairs the agent’s ability to act impartially in the
principal’s best interest”90). Practical guidelines will be offered for
identifying and reconciling these conflicts.
A.

The UPOAA Approach to Conflicts of Interest

The commentary to the UPOAA acknowledges that inherent
conflicts of interest are common when family members serve as agents.91
Examples include circumstances where the agent will inherit whatever is
not expended by the agent on the principal’s behalf and where the
principal and agent co-own real estate or business interests.92 Where
inherent conflicts exist, the agent needs to know whether conduct that is

88. See Linda S. Whitton, The Uniform Power of Attorney Act: Striking a Balance
Between Autonomy and Protection, 1 PHOENIX L. REV. 343, 345-51 (2008) [hereinafter
Whitton, Autonomy and Protection] (describing how flexibility in tailoring delegated
authority and the guidelines for agent conduct facilitates implementation of the
principal’s objectives).
89. UNIF. POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT § 114(b)(1) (2006), 8B U.L.A. 80 (Supp. 2012).
90. Id. § 114(b)(2), 8B U.L.A. 80.
91. Id. § 114 cmt., 8B U.L.A. 82.
92. Id.
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mutually beneficial to the principal and the agent is consistent with the
agent’s duty of loyalty.
Under the UPOAA, that question is answered by the following
provision:
An agent that acts with care, competence, and diligence for the best
interest of the principal is not liable solely because the agent also
benefits from the act or has an individual or conflicting interest in
93
relation to the property or affairs of the principal.

In other words, a conflict of interest or an action that creates a benefit for
the agent is not a per se violation of the agent’s duty of loyalty provided
the agent acts with care, competence, and diligence for the best interest
of the principal.
Referring back to the client scenario in Part I, suppose that Douglas
and his son share co-ownership of rental property. His son is now acting
as the successor agent and learns of a lucrative opportunity to sell the
property. The son has verified that the purchase price exceeds fair
market value and believes the sale is in Douglas’s best interest because
funds are needed to pay for his rising medical costs. In this
circumstance, the UPOAA would protect the son against breach of duty
claims by his siblings because he acted with care, competence, and
diligence for the best interest of the principal.94 Suppose, however, that
the son was in deep debt and needed a quick cash infusion. If he sells the
rental property at less than fair market value so that he can salvage his
finances, the UPOAA provision would not protect him (i.e., he did not
act with care, competence, and diligence, and the below-market price
was not in his father’s best interest). If under different circumstances,
however, the below-market sale was necessitated to meet Douglas’s
medical bills, the son’s decision would likely withstand scrutiny as a
diligent effort to do what was best for the principal.
The result under the common law in a mutual benefit or conflict of
interest situation is more complicated. The Restatement (Second) of
Agency provides that “[u]nless otherwise agreed, an agent is subject to a
duty to his principal to act solely for the benefit of the principal in all
matters connected with his agency.”95 By contrast, the Restatement
(Third) of Agency provides that “[a]n agent has a fiduciary duty to act
loyally for the principal’s benefit in all matters connected with the
agency relationship.”96 The Reporter’s note to this section explains:

93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. § 114(d), 8B U.L.A. 80.
Id.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 387 (1958) (emphasis added).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (2006) (emphasis added).
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In this Restatement, § 8.06 addresses on a comprehensive basis the
circumstances under which a principal may consent to conduct by an
agent that would otherwise constitute a breach of the agent’s
fiduciary duty. This Restatement also formulates the agent’s duty as
one to act “loyally” for the principal’s benefit. This terminology is
intended to clarify that an agent’s loyal service to the principal may,
97
concurrently, be beneficial to the agent.

The Reporter’s note seems to suggest that the principal’s consent is
necessary to deem as “loyal” agent conduct that would otherwise breach
the duty of loyalty because it produced a benefit for the agent.
In her article, Disloyal Agents,98 Professor Deborah A. DeMott,
Reporter for the Restatement (Third) of Agency, writes the following
about principal consent to otherwise “disloyal” agent conduct:
A principal may consent to conduct by the agent that would
otherwise breach a duty of loyalty, but in obtaining the principal’s
consent, the agent must act in good faith and fully disclose material
information to the principal. Although open-ended advance consents
to disloyal conduct are not effective, the fact that a principal may
consent to conduct that would otherwise breach an agent’s duties of
loyalty mitigates the stringency associated with the fiduciary regime
99
and other consequences that follow breach. . . .

Professor DeMott goes on to observe that the common law doctrine of
loyalty is “prophylactic” in that “a breach of a duty of loyalty triggers
remedies and other consequences, distinct from whether the person
protected by the duty can establish that the breach in fact led to injury or
in fact stemmed from disloyal motives on the part of the fiduciary.”100 In
other words, under the common law, an agent with a conflict of interest,
or who receives a benefit without the principal’s consent, faces liability
for breach of the duty of loyalty, even if the agent’s benefit did not injure
the principal.
The departure of the UPOAA from the common law is justified on
two grounds. First, as previously noted, many family member agents
have inherent conflicts of interest.101 Second, a durable power of
attorney, unlike a common law agency relationship, continues
notwithstanding the principal’s incapacity.102 Thus, an incapacitated

97. Id. § 8.01 rptr. n. a.
98. DeMott, supra note 80.
99. Id. at 1052-53 (citations omitted).
100. Id. at 1057.
101. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
102. See UNIF. POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT § 104 (2006), 8B U.L.A. 68 (Supp. 2012)
(creating a presumption of durability for powers of attorney).
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principal cannot give prior consent nor ratify a transaction in which the
agent has a conflict of interest or might receive a benefit.103
Although the UPOAA protects the agent who receives a mutual
benefit or has a conflict of interest, provided the agent acts in the
principal’s best interest,104 that protection may not go far enough in all
circumstances. What if the principal expects the agent to continue a
pattern of annual exclusion gifts to the agent and other family members,
or to spend the principal’s assets for the agent’s living expenses or
tuition? The agent will argue that such expenditures were made in
conformance with the principal’s expectations, but the agent cannot
argue that the expenditures serve the principal’s best interest.105 Without
drafting adjustments in the power of attorney, the agent’s mandatory
duty to follow the principal’s expectations is at odds with the default
duties of loyalty. The following discussion offers practical guidelines for
reconciling these duties when they conflict.
B.

Reconciling the Mandatory Duty to Follow the Principal’s
Expectations with the Default Duties of Loyalty

The UPOAA offers great flexibility for tailoring an agent’s
authority to meet the principal’s needs.106 Setting the scope of
authority—the what of the authorization—is a separate issue, however,
from the principal’s expectations for how the authority is to be exercised.
If these expectations are known, the agent has a mandatory duty to
follow them.107
Conflicts in agent duties may arise when the principal expects the
agent to use the principal’s property in a way that would violate the
agent’s default duties to act loyally108 and avoid conflicts of interest.109
Consider again the example of Douglas, who wanted his wife to have
unfettered authority to use his property for her own benefit and the
benefit of their children.110 If this expectation were stated on the face of
the power of attorney, by implication it would override the default duties

103. See Whitton, Lessons Learned, note 2, at 24-25 (explaining why statutory
protection is necessary for the agent who has an inherent conflict of interest and is
serving under a durable power of attorney).
104. See UNIF. POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT § 114(d) (2006), 8B U.L.A. 80 (Supp.
2012).
105. See generally DeMott, supra note 80.
106. See generally Whitton, Autonomy and Protection, supra note 88.
107. See supra notes 26-47 and accompanying text.
108. See UNIF. POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT § 114(b)(1), 8B U.L.A. 80.
109. See id. § 114(b)(2), 8B U.L.A. 80.
110. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
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of loyalty.111 If, however, the power of attorney neither states the
expectations nor modifies the duties of loyalty, Douglas’s wife risks that
her actions as agent are vulnerable to attack.
Failure to draft for the conflict in agent duties (i.e., the conflict
between the mandatory duty to follow the principal’s expectations and
the default duties of loyalty) burdens the agent with a potential risk of
liability. This risk may also undermine the smooth operation of the
power of attorney if the agent is reluctant to follow the principal’s
expectations for fear of incurring liability.
An inadvertent conflict in duties may also occur where the agent has
a conflict of interest or may receive a mutual benefit from transactions
with the principal’s property interests. Assuming that the agent is bound
by the default duties of loyalty in the Act, the agent with a conflict of
interest is protected only if action on behalf of the principal is taken with
care, competence, and diligence for the best interest of the principal.112
What if a principal does not expect the agent to act in the principal’s best
interest with respect to co-owned property, but fails to express this
expectation in the power of attorney or to modify the agent’s duties of
loyalty?
Consider again the example of Douglas who appointed his oldest
son as his successor agent. Suppose that the rental property, titled in
both of their names, was actually intended as a gift to the son. Douglas’s
name remained on the title so that his son could obtain better mortgage
interest and insurance rates. If the oldest son needs money and uses his
authority to sell the property quickly, at below market value, his siblings
may feel justified challenging his conduct as a breach of his duties of
loyalty. In this scenario, the power of attorney did not adjust the default
duties of loyalty, and the oldest son will have no proof of his now
incapacitated father’s expectations.
The foregoing examples illustrate common circumstances in which
an agent’s mandatory duty to act according to the principal’s
expectations could conflict with the default duties of loyalty. How can
the drafting lawyer anticipate such conflicts and create a power of
attorney that is effective to achieve the principal’s goals without
exposing the honorable agent to inadvertent risk?

111. Stating expectations in the power of attorney that are inconsistent with one or
more default duties is a means of “providing otherwise” in the power of attorney. See
supra note 72 (discussing the portion of UNIF. POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT art. 1 cmt. that
addresses default rules in the UPOAA); supra note 87 (advising that, when the principal’s
expectations conflict with the agent’s default duties, either the expectations must be
stated in the power of attorney, the default duties must be modified, or both).
112. UNIF. POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT § 114(d) (2006), 8B U.L.A. 80 (Supp. 2012).
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A two-step analysis provides the answer. First, the drafting attorney
should determine from the client interview whether the principal intends
the agent to act in a manner that diverges from an objective view of the
principal’s “best interest.”113 Examples include making gifts or
providing other types of support to the agent from the principal’s
property. Second, if the answer to this determination is yes, the client
must choose between (1) explicitly stating the expectations in the power
of attorney, thus cancelling by implication the default duties of loyalty114
and (2) modifying the duties of loyalty in the power of attorney without
explicitly stating the expectations, thus allowing those expectations to
remain flexible.115 Although the drafting attorney may be reluctant to
recommend modification of the default duties of loyalty, which reduces
certain protections for the principal,116 the internal tension between these
duties and the principal’s expectations cannot be ignored.
CONCLUSION
Current practice with respect to powers of attorney falls short of
adequately guiding the honorable agent who wants to “do right” by the
principal. Agents need a clear understanding of their authority and how
the principal wishes them to exercise that authority. The failure to
communicate these parameters may undermine the principal’s objectives
and lead to an agent’s inadvertent breach of duties.
Agents may have difficulty understanding their authority due to the
cryptic labels commonly used on short form powers of attorney.
Preparation of an opinion of counsel or other explanatory document to
accompany the power of attorney should be an encouraged best practice
in the power of attorney drafting process. An explanatory document will
help ensure that the principal, agent, and persons who deal with the agent
understand exactly what is delegated. This understanding is essential for
the agent’s compliance with the mandatory duty to act only within the
scope of authority granted in the power of attorney.
Agents may also lack understanding of other duties and how to
reconcile conflicting duties and conflicts of interest. The UPOAA
requires an agent to act according to the principal’s reasonable
expectations if known and otherwise in the principal’s best interest. If
the principal expects the agent to act in a manner that may not comport
113. See generally DeMott, supra note 80 (discussing the stringent common law
view).
114. See supra note 111.
115. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
116. See generally Whitton, Autonomy and Protection, supra note 88 (discussing the
inherent tension between drafting for the principal’s autonomy and the principal’s
protection).
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with the principal’s best interest, such as using the principal’s property
for the support of the agent (a common expectation for family member
agents), the principal’s expectations will likely conflict with the agent’s
default duties of loyalty. The vigilant drafting lawyer should conduct a
thorough client interview to identify the principal’s expectations as well
as potential conflicting duties and conflicts of interest. Armed with this
information, the lawyer can make appropriate drafting adjustments in the
power of attorney. Failure to do so may expose the agent to inadvertent
risk and undermine the effectiveness of the principal’s power of attorney.

